By Istanbul was recommended as the site of direct Russian-Ukrainian peace talks on May 10 by Russian President Vladimir Putin. In the Turkish metropolis on the banks of the Bosphorus, direct negotiations between the two sides ran aground once, in April 2022, after the Kremlin imposed unacceptable conditions for Kyiv a few weeks after attacking its neighbor. The choice of location reveals more about Turkey’s increased geopolitical importance than Istanbul’s appeal.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who exercises full power, has made his country an unavoidable factor in recent years, so to speak, in all conflicts that directly or indirectly affect the security of Europe. A common feature of Syria, Libya, Somalia, Nagorno-Karabakh, the Middle East and the war in Ukraine is that none of them was free from Ankara’s political and/or military turmoil aimed at expanding Turkey’s geopolitical influence in an extremely turbulent and unstable region.
Turkey and the Ukraine War
The Eurasian power with NATO’s second strongest army under Erdogan, also known as the „Sultan”, has almost perfected the Turkish peacock dance, becoming able to simultaneously maintain its credibility and neutral position in the eyes of both opposing sides, Ukraine and Russia. While condemning in words the aggression against Ukraine and Bayraktar using drones and other weapons to help Kyiv’s patriotic war, Ankara refused to take over the political, economic, financial and energy sanctions imposed by the West against Moscow. Instead, it concentrated on restarting Ukrainian grain deliveries, which are important for the world’s food supplies, and tried to get maximum benefit as a consumer and transit country, from Russian natural gas deliveries through the Turkish Stream.
Donald Trump’s return to the White House and the first hundred days of the new administration, if possible, increased the value of Turkey’s role in the eyes of the European Union, which is concerned about its security. As a sign of this, Ankara no longer only showed a keen interest in participating in the European Political Community (EPK), but also joined the „Coalition of the Willing” along with the United Kingdom and Norway as the third significant non-EU member state to achieve a just and lasting peace in Ukraine.
Visit of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Ukraine in 2022. Meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky (Photo: Presidency of Republic of Ukraine / Wikimedia Commons)
With this, it can not only increase Turkey’s geopolitical weight, but also bring massive European orders to the Turkish military industry. Especially considering that the European Union, which is forced to say goodbye to the American peace dividend in one form or another and stand on its own feet defensively, currently lacks the weapon systems and military structures with which it could deter a Russian aggression that could potentially occur within a few years.
A New Chapter in EU–Turkish Relations?
The new situation in both Turkey and the EU has raised hopes that, despite the serious violations of human rights by the Erdogan regime, the two sides can get closer to each other along common interests and renew the political relations that have been frozen for many years. The arrest of the Turkish president’s number one political challenger, Istanbul mayor Ekram Imamoglu, on March 23, based on trumped-up charges, according to most political analysts, hit this easing process as thunder. Its likely purpose; to prevent the politician who harbors hopes of victory from running in the next presidential election due in 2028.
It was no coincidence that the sophisticated Turkish president timed the arrest of his number one political opponent at a time when, according to his conviction, Europe, caught in the pincer, needs cooperation with Turkey more than ever before. His calculation came true in large part, after Brussels and the majority of European capitals, with the exception of a few admonishments, reacted remarkably restrainedly to another anti-democratic move by the Turkish president. Only the European Parliament argued, in a resolution voted by a large majority at the plenary session at the beginning of May, that „Turkey’s geopolitical and strategic importance does not make the democratic backsliding of the government acceptable and the EU membership criteria cannot be negotiated.”
The restrained European reactions clearly illustrate the dilemma that the EU has to face more and more often in the new world order:
Can European and democratic values, including human rights, be sacrificed or relegated to the altar of the EU’s strategic and geopolitical interests?
Although there is not and probably will not be a clear answer to the question, as shown by the Turkish example or the helplessness in the face of the Israeli atrocities committed in Gaza, the EU must always consider its reactions on an ad hoc basis and often put its interests before its values. Which, according to critics, destroys its authority worldwide and ultimately reduces its influence.
Escaping the Trap
How can the EU escape this duality?
Whether it is the new American government, the old eternal leadership, or others, it has been obvious for some time that the EU should take a more transactional approach in its bilateral relations by not subordinating everything to one principle and attempts to make deals.
Translated into the Turkish situation, this means that while Europe is trying to find a common language with Erdogan, it is not completely renouncing its favorable influence on Turkish domestic political processes and its support for the democratic opposition. After all, as can be seen within the EU and in Hungary, political changes can only be achieved from within, by Turkish society, while external attempts have mostly been counterproductive.
The European Union also has certain cards in its hands against Ankara, such as the modernization of the customs union, which has long become timely, or visa liberalization.
However, these have not so far been enough of an incentive for the Turkish president to implement democratic reforms. In fact, it seemed like a convenient solution for both sides that Ankara has no intention of meeting the conditions for accession, so Turkish EU membership will forever remain a theoretical issue.
Anti-coup protesters after 15 July 2016 Turkish coup d’état attempt in Bağcılar, İstanbul, Turkey (Photo: Maurice Flesier / Wikimedia Commons)
Therefore, it may seem strange at first that some political analysts are now advising the EU to consider resurrecting the Turkish accession process, which is in a dead state, based on the principles of meritocracy.
According to Riccardo Gasco, a professor at the University of Bologna, coordinator of the foreign policy program at Istanbul University of Istanbul, and his Turkish colleague, Ayse Yürekli, one way to do this would be for the union to tie the renewal of the customs union agreement to tangible democratic reforms.
They also suggest that the EU could take another step by allowing visa-free entry for specific groups, such as students, young entrepreneurs and those active in academia, in exchange for democratic reforms. The experts would also maintain high-level dialogue between the two parties, always keeping the issue of democratic reforms on the agenda above all else.
With this method, according to political scientists, the EU could simultaneously stand up for values and promote democratic reforms, while accepting harsh realities. However, the success of this attitude presupposes that Erdogan sees enough political and economic benefits for himself and his power machine in continuing the accession negotiations.
The arrest of the leader of the opposition, whatever the real reason, reveals that Recep Tayyip Erdogan is actually afraid of losing his power after 22 years and does not shy away from even the most extreme steps in order to keep it. Despite the mass protests since the end of March, it seems that the expiry of the regime’s warranty may take years and the EU will have minimal influence on all of this.
