By Since former Prime Minister Viktor Orban was ousted as Hungary’s Prime Minister after 16 years, Hungary has been in somewhat of a ‘honeymoon’ phase: new Prime Minister Peter Magyar has been able to restart relations with the European Union (EU) and reinstate EU recovery funds desperately needed for the country to rebuild.
But the dissonance between the wider European and Hungarian approaches to migration may end this phase.
Magyar promised Hungarian voters that he would not change Orban’s migration policy – a cornerstone of his tenure as PM – while the EU approach has evolved significantly since it condemned Orban’s 2015 ‘No Migration’ stance. Now, the €1million-a-day fine penalizes Hungary for policies that, according to Magyar, many member states hope to implement with the newly accepted EU Pact on Migration and Asylum.
Promises vs. Reality
Before his election, Magyar made it clear he had no intention of joining the EU’s Migration Pact nor dismantling the fence at the Serbian border. However, he also pledged to do so in accordance with EU law, thus bringing an end to the EU’s fine, to stop allowing in non-EU migrant workers, and to stop releasing human traffickers – both of which happened under the Orban government.
As of 6 June, it is no longer possible to apply for a new guest-worker residence permit, as no third countries are eligible to apply for a residence permit, thanks to new legislation.
The release of human traffickers is technically still possible, but the bill will soon drafted to obstruct any attempts to stop the legal proceedings against these criminals.
Most promises are on the way or have already been solved. The Serbian border wall, however, remains tricky.
The Fine vs. the Pact
In 2024, Brussels fined Hungary €200 million and a daily penalty after Orban’s government failed to implement a 2020 European Court of Justice ruling. The court had found that Hungary failed to guarantee asylum seekers the right to fair treatment after authorities forced them to file asylum applications at the Hungarian Consulate in Belgrade, Serbia, by denying them entry to Hungary at its Serbian border. Asylum seekers were unable to enter Hungary due to the country’s border fence with Serbia, and most applications submitted in Belgrade were rejected.
EP Plenary session – Council and Commission statements – Presentation of the programme of activities of the Hungarian Presidency Photo: European Union 2024 – Alain Rolland
Magyar pledged to keep the policy, implemented by Orban during the 2015 migration wave, but also promised to bring home EU funds and end the daily fine. As such, the new Hungarian government has been seeking ways to prove to the courts that these measures are now being implemented by other Member States under the EU’s common asylum policy pact.
“It is clear that the attitude in Europe is changing completely, and now almost every member state, except one or two, wants to act – and will act – much more radically and forcefully in preventing illegal migration,” Magyar said.
“It is unfair and unacceptable that Hungary, in an entirely new situation, has to pay a million euros a day for a measure that others are also taking – perhaps through lower-level legislation or different mechanisms.”
The policy has been renewed every six months, including last week, reasoning that Ceuta renews the cause for concern. This reflects Magyar’s attempts to stall significant changes until his government finds the legal link to keeping the border fence as part of the EU’s Migration and Asylum Pact.
“One single legal loophole, one poorly prepared change, could create an unmanageable situation in a very short time. The Hungarian government cannot afford to take such a risk,” the Prime Minister stated.
End of Domestic Bliss?
The last Eurobarometer survey was conducted during the spring; the 1020 Hungarian interviews took place face-to-face from 14 April 2026 to 1 May 2026 – just days after Orban’s election defeat on 12 April. The results reflect the optimism of Hungarian voters.
73 percent of Hungarians were optimistic about the future of their country, representing a 16 percent increase from last year, outstanding compared to 58 percent of the EU average. 57 percent of the surveyed described their emotional state as hopeful, and data across the survey suggests the EU continues to enjoy high support in Hungary.
Most citizens cited inflation and the cost-of-living crisis as their priority (45 percent), followed by economy and job creation (43 percent), public health (37 percent), and food security (30 percent).
Migration and asylum occupied a middle ground with 20 percent, indicating a slight increase. This suggests that, although Hungarians viewed domestic issues as more important, migration did not fade as an issue and was merely shelved. If Magyar fails to balance domestic and EU demands, it will cause major problems for his standing at home.
According to Eurobarometer, since records began in 2005, Hungarians have had mixed feelings on trusting their government, with the highest share of trust in their government reaching 48 percent – last time this happened was after Orban’s 2022 election victory, after which it remained around 40 percent and below. Magyar’s government had only been in power for a few days during the last Eurobarometer survey, but trust in the government reached 45 percent for the first time since 2022, though mistrust scored slightly higher than it did during Orban’s 2022 statistics.
So, while hopes are high, Hungarians have cause to be suspicious of new governments; the data shows that right after a vote, the country’s trust is high but quickly decreases as policies are drawn up.
A failure to deliver in migration would bring an end to the domestic bliss and comfortable support Magyar’s party and government have enjoyed. The Hungarian people have long been disillusioned with their politicians; Magyar’s failure would mean the failure of non-Orban politics, and the renewed passion for democracy could falter – giving leverage for a post-Orban FIDESZ’s anti-EU message.
Migration is especially precarious in this regard; Orban successfully created an image of migration as a foreign policy problem that is forced on Hungary, rather than a domestic issue politicians can influence from home, as in other states.
If Magyar relaxes Hungarian laws to adhere to EU demands, he might heal some wounds in relations but pays a steep price back home by disappointing those voters who still fear Brussels controls Hungarian policy.
Furthermore, the far-right Mi Hazánk Mozgalom (Our Homeland Movement) party has six members of parliament. Should Magyar falter on migration, one of the party’s main concerns, they will loudly call out the government, stirring their supporters who had been content to let Orban lead with milder versions of far-right policies.
New Territory
The situation will serve as an example for the EU’s handling of a country overcoming democratic backsliding and attempting the slippery climb back. How it aids or obstructs this path will determine a lot about the EU’s standing as a moral institution.
For Magyar, the “honeymoon phase” has long been ought to reach its end as the government begins to falter on certain areas, such as the presidency of the MBVK (the Hungarian Chamber of Judicial Enforcement), an office previously involved in corruption scandals, or the decision to increase pensions and disability-related benefits, a move that echoes Orban’s welfare politics.
There is substantial domestic pressure on TISZA to deliver its renewal of the Hungarian political elite and government institutions as well. The whole country is watching eagerly whether Magyar’s government is creating a more democratic system or merely refashioning Orban’s “illiberal state” for its own gains. However, how this government handles the migration problem will greatly influence their “saviour” image.
