By The UK’s relationship with European integration has always been marked by hesitation—arriving late, leaving early, yet never fully detaching. Now, in the post-Brexit era, Britain finds itself caught between two stools, navigating between a Union it once helped shape and an unpredictable US, facing the challenge of recalibrating its economic and defence strategy in a shifting global landscape.
The UK and the EU: The History of Cooperation and Estrangement
From the outset, Britain’s relationship with European integration has been complex and often conflicted. Despite Winston Churchill’s 1946 call for a ‘United States of Europe’, Britain declined to join the European Coal and Steel Community in 1953 for both economic and ideological reasons. Producing as much coal as the six member states combined, the UK saw little benefit in the scheme, and the French insistence on supra-nationalism was incompatible with Britain’s staunchly anchored system of parliamentary sovereignty.
As policymakers still prioritised ties with the Commonwealth – to secure cheap agricultural goods – and the United States, joining the European Economic Community (EEC) at its creation in 1957 was not appealing either. Instead, the UK responded by forming a rival organisation, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960.
Yet, by the early 1960s, the country had fallen behind most EEC states in terms of earnings, which prompted a pragmatic shift, and the UK applied for membership – only to be vetoed twice by French President Charles de Gaulle, who doubted Britain’s commitment and compatibility with the European model.
With de Gaulle leaving office, the UK finally joined the EEC in 1973, accompanied by considerable domestic fanfare. External economic shocks such as the oil crisis and the following US dollar devaluation quickly complicated matters, and Britain found itself pulled between its “special relationship” with the US and its new European commitments. Only a year later, the newly elected Labour government under Prime Minister Edward Heath launched a “fundamental renegotiation” of the country’s EC terms, addressing political cleavages like agricultural policy, parliamentary sovereignty, and financing of the common budget. Minor, yet symbolically significant changes were ratified in 1975 by the Dublin European Council, which was followed by a national referendum, where two-thirds voted to remain in the EC.
Still, political divisions remained, particularly over the budget. Margaret Thatcher’s government raised what became known as the “Bloody British question”, securing a permanent rebate for the UK on its EC contributions at the 1984 European Council in Fontainebleau.
It was Thatcher’s colleague Lord Cockfield who pioneered with his paper on the “Completion of the Internal Market” in 1985, but once it became clear that for Continental Europeans, the Single Market was a means to deeper political integration, she articulated her resistance. In her 1988 Bruges speech, she rejected the idea of a “European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels”, a rhetoric mirrored by current eurosceptic politicians.
Although signing the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union in 1992, Britain increasingly rejected key developments such as the Euro, Schengen, and aspects of social and judicial policy, becoming a “semi-detached” member – a full one in form, but with numerous legal and political opt-outs that underscored its affliction with European integration.
This affliction culminated in the 2011 European Union Act under PM David Cameron, which introduced a referendum lock on future power transfers to the EU and reaffirmed national sovereignty. In 2016, a second referendum was held after failed attempts to renegotiate Britain’s membership terms, and 52% of voters chose to leave the EU. Brexit negotiations proved long and strenuous, leading to Theresa May’s resignation and Boris Johnson’s rise with a promise to “get Brexit done”.
Post-Brexit Economy
The Office for Budget Responsibility measures and further predicts long-term trade reductions and thus lower productivity for the post-Brexit economy, which is encapsulated in the trade element of the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA).
After a global decline in trade volumes at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, Britain’s trade intensity has not recovered as fast as other G7 countries’, particularly goods trade has fallen significantly behind. Trade is especially declining in textiles and vehicles, sectors extensively linked to the EU. Meanwhile, the UK is the strongest among G7 countries in service trade, possibly due to lower trade barriers to the EU and increased service exports to the US. The latter number might be caused by US firms outsourcing work to the UK, which is further endowed by the recent weakness of the pound. Ironically, immigration – one of the key motivators for Leave voters – has increased since 2020, due to global worker visa policies.
Today, while the British majority believes Brexit was a mistake, few advocate for rejoining. Labour leader Keir Starmer, in 2024, promised to reset relations with the EU but ruled out rejoining the single market or customs union. The EU, for its part, welcomes this more constructive tone.
As mentioned before, the US is one of the UK’s largest single trading partners, both in terms of exports and imports. In 2020, the UK aimed to demonstrate that it could forge new trade deals, but negotiations have proven more complex than anticipated. Disagreements regarding food standards, digital trade and data protection and financial services have slowed down negotiations even during the Biden administration.
When it comes to more recent happenings, Elon Musk’s scurrilous posts on his platform X, in which he calls for ‘Prison for Starmer’ have probably become an integral part of the US-UK relationship.
Still, Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s efforts to engage with diplomatic charm with the second Trump administration are unique by European standards. Starmer was the second European head of state to visit the White House since Trump’s recent inauguration – a visit he is said to have prepared for a long time, and down to minor details.
Trump even accepted his invitation to a state visit to the UK and praised him as a ‘tough negotiator’. Well, this tactic of charming Trump doesn’t seem to have worked so far. In Trump’s world, World Tariff Day means World Tariff Day, and the US no longer seems to cultivate special relationships.
On April 1, the UK was affected by a new round of US tariffs, part of broader protectionist measures reintroduced by President Donald Trump. Britain received the lowest tariff rate of 10 per cent, and a 25 per cent tariff rate on vehicles and steel sectors, a move that sparked concern for the trade-dependent economy. The EU, which the UK left only five years ago, was charged 20 per cent. Responses from London seem calm and align with the previous strategy of diplomacy: British Business Minister Jonathan Reynolds emphasised the need for continued engagement with the US, and Finance Minister Rachel Reeves is scheduled to meet with US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent.
Britain’s Take on European Rearmament
Economic policy instability is not the only recently emerged issue for governments worldwide to tackle: Russia’s war in Ukraine, and the termination of USAID and hence US military aid to the attacked country evoke “old” security concerns.
According to the UK Ministry of Defence, the country’s armed forces’ inventory includes a range of vessels, land equipment, and aircraft, ensuring operational readiness across multiple domains. The UK is one of nine countries to uphold nuclear weaponry, possessing a stockpile of approximately 225 nuclear warheads. Although the UK had previously committed in the 2000s to reducing its nuclear warhead stockpile from 280 to 180 by the mid-2020s, this target was not implemented. Reversing their policy, the government announced in 2021 an increase in the cap to 260 warheads. Moreover, transparency surrounding the UK’s nuclear arsenal has diminished; the precise size of the stockpile has not been publicly disclosed for over 15 years. This development aligns with a broader and concerning international trend toward reduced nuclear transparency.
In support of Ukraine, the UK has extended financial assistance, having disbursed the first £752 million tranche of a £2.26 billion loan in March intended for Ukraine to procure military equipment.
European countries aim to gain military autonomy, especially from their ally, the US, which has proven unreliable. They have therefore collectively increased defence equipment procurement spending, reaching over €90 billion in 2024. However, a substantial portion of defence equipment is procured from non-European sources, notably from the US, which renders their efforts for autonomy almost futile. French President Emmanuel Macron’s call to “buy European” weaponry is of European strategic interest, and of economic interest to France, where the arms and defence industry generated €40.5 billion worth of sales in 2024. France is only preceded by the UK in terms of sales, where businesses in this sector reported €41.3 billion last year. Starmer’s urge to involve Britain in European defence spending plans reflects vital economic interest, potentially fostering trade and dependency. Whether this interdependence proves advantageous and reliable for Europe may, however, depend on the future trajectory of US-UK relations.
Britain now finds itself walking a tightrope between its two old flames: the ever-unpredictable United States and a European Union rediscovering its interest in strategic independence from the latter. With Washington throwing up trade barriers and Brussels calling for defence unity, the UK has little room for missteps. It must charm both sides without losing sight of its own economic and security needs. The game is all about balance—too much tilt one way, and Britain risks being left out in the cold. In a world where alliances shift faster than headlines, staying relevant might be the UK’s toughest diplomatic mission yet.
