Building of the German Bundestag (Photo: Jörg Braukmann / Wikimedia Commons)
Building of the German Bundestag (Photo: Jörg Braukmann / Wikimedia Commons)
Longreads

The Eras Tour: Germany’s Governments Edition

There is a Czech idiom I find myself quoting more and more in these past years. In Czech, it goes ‘Po bitvě je každý generálem’, and translated, it means ‘after the battle, everybody is a general’. In meaning, it is similar to what the English idiom ‘to be wise after the event’ conveys: in hindsight, the correct course of action is readily apparent.

After Germany’s traffic light coalition comprising of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the Greens has been dismantled following Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s (SPD) dismissal of Finance Minister Christian Lindner (FDP) on November 6, 2024, pure shock broke through Germany and Europe, while others seemed to align themselves with the notion of this Czech idiom: that, indeed, the quick break of the coalition and the FDP’s immediate withdrawal from it (exempt transport minister Volker Wissing) was predictable.

Now impossible to deny, a trend towards instability has been there in German politics; one that in the future, amongst a weakened French government and a Republican-led U.S. administration, might account for a fallout on burning issues such as environmental policies and European defense.

A Final Flicker of the Ampel

The traffic light coalition suffered its final stab when a new economic proposal was presented by Christian Lindner (FDP). Such economic proposal was reminiscent of the 1982 paper written by then-Economy Minister Otto Graf Lambsdorff, which led to the collapse of the SPD–FDP-led government in the Federal Republic of Germany. Like back in 1982, Christian Lindner’s economic proposal has been likened to “divorce papers” within the coalition as well, with the difference that in 2024, Lindner’s divorce papers not only left the German government facing significant instability but Europe simultaneously. Now, all eyes are on German voters as the doubts unfold concerning the Alternative für Deutschland’s (AfD) popularity, the Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands’s (CDU)/ Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (CSU) seemingly content position of hanging back in opposition and the results of the snap elections on 23 February 2025.

The Glacial Transformation of German Bipartisanship

So, how did the scaling change amongst the Volksparteien, the ‘people’s parties’, such as the CDU)/CSU and the SPD? When did the traditionally ‘junior’ parties, like the FDP and the Greens lose their popularity for the benefit of the AfD’s? And lastly, how did Germany reckon with a seemingly rock-solid party-political configuration? Seen in this light, the coalition’s collapse was less of a dramatic twist than a culmination of longstanding structural shifts.

Before the watershed year of 1990, the politics of the Federal Republic of Germany was determined by the rivalry between the CDU (together with its Bavarian sister party, the CSU) and the SPD, sometimes influenced by FDP, the ‘third’ party, with considerably less sway then its counterparts. The general line-up was not changed by the post-reunification era, also known as the Kohl era (1990-1998).

Kurt Furgler, Deutscher Bundeskanzler Helmut Kohl und Jean-Pascal Delamuraz in 1991 (Photo: St. Gallen Symposium / Wikimedia Commons)

Kurt Furgler, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (in center) and Jean-Pascal Delamuraz in 1991 (Photo: St. Gallen Symposium / Wikimedia Commons)

Helmut Kohl, being the head of the CDU since 1973, experienced the great euphoria following the reunification of the country, alongside the German citizens, and then went on to experience the economic hardship following said euphoria.

The consolidating power of the CDU and the Kohl-administration’s sole focus of integrating the former East Germany’s into the FRG’s economic system came to a halt when the true economic burden of the reunification, more specifically, the massive investments of the Aufbau Ost was realised.

By the late 1990s, public dissatisfaction, rising unemployment and such economic liability led to a point where nothing was enough for the CDU/CSU to keep their power in the elections in 1998, not even the support of the FDP, and as Kohl’s integrity was burnt to the ground by the Schwarzgeldaffäre, the embezzlement scandal, his influence waned. Having regained its control, the SPD, together in a coalition with the Greens, saw an opening under the leadership of Gerhard Schröder, a cooperation that became known as the Red-Green coalition, lasting until 2005. The Schröder-Fischer years were marked by the dotcom bubble and consequently, Agenda 2010. Stock market investments were overhyped and the bubble burst, leading to the worsening of the already elevated unemployment ratio.

Thus came Agenda 2010, a set of far-reaching labour market and social welfare reforms that were designed to reduce Germany’s then-high unemployment rate. While Agenda 2010 was credited with modernising the labour market and helping to moderate long-term unemployment, it also sparked fierce conflict within Schröder’s SDP, as many felt Agenda 2010 went against Germany’s traditional welfare model, and this eventually led to the downfall of Schröder.

The Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Mr. Gerhard Schroder signing the visitor's book at the Samadhi of Mahatma Gandhi at Rajghat in Delhi on October 07, 2004 (Photo: The Government of India / Wikimedia Commons)

The Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Mr. Gerhard Schroder signing the visitor’s book at the Samadhi of Mahatma Gandhi at Rajghat in Delhi on October 07, 2004 (Photo: The Government of India / Wikimedia Commons)

The fall of Schröder meant that CDU’s Angela Merkel gained popularity and rose to power in 2005 in what was referred to as the grand coalition between the CDU/CSU and the SPD. Angela Merkel, being chancellor for 16 years, remained chancellor to the grand coalition, except for the years between 2009 and 2013. Economically, Merkel inherited the tailwinds of Agenda 2010’s labour and welfare reforms, benefiting from a robust period of job growth, wage increases and strengthening of workers’ insurance and the labour code. However, not less than three global crises soon tested her steady-handed style of leadership: the 2008 real estate crash and subsequent global financial crisis challenged Germany’s export-dependent economy, but also, consolidated Merkel’s role as a crisis manager on the European stage.

In 2009, as the eurozone debt crisis rattled southern European economies, Merkel played a vital part in orchestrating multi-national bailout and austerity mechanisms, leading to the solidification of Germany’s economic and political clout in the EU. Then came 2015 with the refugee crisis, during which Merkel and her Wir schaffen das” politics inherently intertwined the EU’s fiscal and political governance with Germany’s role in European and global affairs.

Angela Merkel in 2017 (Photo: Markus Spiske / Wikimedia Commons)

Angela Merkel in 2017 (Photo: Markus Spiske / Wikimedia Commons)

Merkel Steered Left, A New Right Emerged

Merkel’s era also saw the rise of the Greens and the formation of the AfD, and consequently, the beginning of Germany’s political landscape’s fragmentation. Issues like climate change, migration or even European integration cut across old left-right divides, and while the old parties tried to tailor these new problems to fit their agendas, they left an opening for the Greens to champion environmentalism, and later, broader social justice and pro-European stances, and for the AfD to champion immigration- and euroscepticism. The AfD, initially advocating for Eurosceptic ideas, slowly turned toward a nationalist, anti-immigration ideology, fuelled by the migration crisis.

The socioeconomic shifts of globalisation and digitalisation strained the traditional appeal of the Volksparteien, and industrial workers, more notably known as once loyal SPD voters, grew increasingly sceptical of the party’s market-friendly reforms. Alongside them, more conservative voters, disillusioned with perceived centrism of the CDU/CSU also started to gravitate toward the AfD, and such were the conditions under which Olaf Scholz (SPD) took over the Chancellorship from Merkel in December 2021. Scholz’s coalition of the SDP, FDP and the Greens – the traffic light coalition, did not only equal the (fleeting) new rise of the SDP but also of the Greens.

However, Scholz’s coalition ran out of ground to cover before they could find common ground. On one hand, the FDP pushed for strict fiscal discipline and more market-friendly reforms; and on the other, the Greens demanded higher levels of public investment in climate protection, education, and social services. As the electorate’s growing polarization and the rise of populist sentiment exacerbated the coalition’s internal fault lines, disagreements over the scale and speed of Germany’s transition to renewable energy, the handling of asylum policies in response to new migratory pressures and the allocation of increased defense spending also piled on.

Combined, these overlapping issues gradually paved the way toward collapse, where not even Olaf Scholz, who was caught between these diverging visions, could maintain cohesion within his government. Such lack of concord have the chance to cause problems as unity between French President Macron and the German Chancellor is essential in EU decision-making.

Olaf Scholz signing the book of condolences at Jacques Delors's funeral in 2024 (Photo: European Union / Wikimedia Commons)

Olaf Scholz signing the book of condolences at Jacques Delors’s funeral in 2024 (Photo: European Union / Wikimedia Commons)

German Snap Elections in 2025: The Only Constant is Change

Now, just around forty days before the election on 23 February 2025, the CDU/CSU appears first in voter preference with around 32 percent, while the AfD with roughly 19 percent scores in second. The SPD is third with approximately 16 percent, while Greens with around 13% percent are in the fourth place – but neither enjoys the comfort of a clear majority.

These narrow margins amongst the runner-ups mirror the voters’ conflicting attitudes not just between strict fiscal discipline and lingering demand to fuel greener economic growth, but on discussions on European security (focusing on NATO and the war in Ukraine) and on labor markets (especially around migration and skilled immigration).

The numbers are hardly in need of explanation. With 735 seats and the 5 percent threshold as granting entry to the Bundestag, no party alone has 50 percent of the seats, making a coalition not only highly unlikely but a necessity. Such vitality of a coalition presupposes that the AfD cannot be involved in it, as the CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP and the Greens have repeatedly and publicly ruled out forming a coalition with the AfD.

Thus, the decision remains in the hands of Germany’s mainstream parties.

However, based on the past three years and their very public falling-out, a tight cooperation between the Greens and the FDP seems highly unlikely. Further looming is the presence of the far-right AfD, which, despite being ostracised from typical coalition equations, keeps building its prospective voters’ day by day and currently leads a double-digit in popularity, contributing to serious fragmentation of German and European politics.

Eszter Orsolya Olasz
Eszter Orsolya Olasz is a Hungarian university student, currently pursuing degrees in European Studies (European Union Law) and English Language and Culture at the University of Amsterdam. Her work focuses on the intersections of law, culture and environmental matters.

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