By In the midst of a worsening humanitarian crisis, Syria’s interim government, led by the insurgent group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), is at a critical juncture in its efforts to rebuild and reintegrate citizens returning to their homes. The Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa, formerly head of HTS, is making an effort for the international community to recognize himself and his country.
Meanwhile, six years after the war against the Islamic State, Iraq still faces significant challenges to its recovery and easing of sectarian differences. The Mohammed Shia’ Al Sudani lead Iraqi government also faces ongoing tensions with Kurdish groups pressing for greater autonomy.
Although both Middle Eastern states are potential sources of migration waves, little is discussed in the European public discourse – especially about Iraq – concerning their importance.
To fill this void, we asked two researchers from the Migration Research Institute in Budapest (MRI) to help us understand the recent happenings and the background dynamics of the Mezopotiman states.
Meszár Tárik, senior researcher at MRI, studied at the Faculty of Arts of Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE), majoring in Oriental Languages and Cultures, with a minor in Aesthetics. He graduated from ELTE with a master’s degree in Arabic, where he is PhD student of Arabic Studies. Previously, he worked as an interpreter expert for the Hungarian Armed Forces.
Omar Sayfo, Research Director at MRI, received his first degree from the Department of Semitic Philology and Arabic Studies at the ELTE and his second degree from the Department of Political Science at the ELTE Faculty of Social Sciences. He received his PhD from Utrecht University in 2016. His writings have been published in several foreign journals, including The New York Times and Foreign Policy.
Meszár Tárik: Iraq is an Economic Lifeline for Iran
Several years after the defeat of ISIS, the situation in the country cannot be described as stable. Given the condition of more than a million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other pressing internal problems (sectarian and ethnic conflicts, relations with Iraqi Kurdistan, and socioeconomic issues), what is the current situation of the Mesopotamian state?
Iraq continues to grapple with deep-rooted challenges. According to UNHCR data, the country hosts over 300,000 refugees and asylum seekers, nearly 90 percent of whom originate from the Syrian Arab Republic.
Additionally, more than one million IDPs remain within Iraq’s borders, unable to return home due to persistent insecurity, limited access to public services, financial hardship, damaged housing in their places of origin, and the looming threat of extremist groups.
Compounding the instability is Iran’s growing influence, particularly through its backing of militias operating within Iraq. These groups, openly hostile toward the United States and Israel, have engaged in frequent armed confrontations, significantly escalating security risks. Given the current volatility, the possibility of a major conflict cannot be ruled out.
Sectarian tensions, which reignited after 2003, reached a breaking point around 2006, plunging the country into civil war.
Tárik Meszár
The rise of ISIS in 2014 forced even more minority groups to flee their homes. Iraq’s Christian community, which once had around 1.4 million people, has now shrunk to just 200,000. Many feel increasingly sidelined, with little political representation, inadequate security, and restrictive laws making life even harder. One clear example is the ban on alcohol sales – a major source of income for many Christian families – adding yet another financial burden to an already struggling community.
Tensions also persist between the Kurdish Regional Government and Baghdad.
Despite their autonomy, the Kurds remain financially dependent on Iraq’s central budget, often clashing with the federal government over revenue distribution. Accusations of unauthorized oil sales have further strained relations.
Adding to the turmoil, Turkish airstrikes periodically target northern Iraq, aiming at key leaders and members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which both Turkey and the international community classify as a terrorist organization. However, these operations frequently result in civilian casualties, sparking widespread protests among the local population.
Iraq’s road to stability remains fraught with obstacles, demanding urgent and sustained international attention.
With the departure of Assad from power, Iran has lost one of its main allies in the Middle East. Does this also mean that Tehran “tightens the leash” on Bagdad?
A complex geopolitical standoff is unfolding as the United States pushes for the disarmament of Iraqi militias aligned with Iran. Despite suffering recent setbacks – such as Hezbollah’s weakening and its forced retreat from Syria – Iran remains steadfast in its regional ambitions, and its affiliated Iraqi militias remain armed and active.
Beyond military influence, Iraq is an economic lifeline for Iran, which continues to grapple with crippling international sanctions.
Baghdad imports substantial amounts of gas and electricity from Iran, alongside various other goods, creating a level of economic interdependence. Meanwhile, allegations of illicit activities persist, including reports that Iraqi political entities are facilitating the sale of Iranian oil despite international bans. This places the Iraqi government in a delicate position: it seeks to maintain strategic relations with both the United States and Iran, often walking a precarious diplomatic tightrope.
A few weeks ago, the Iraqi prime minister announced that a top ISIS leader, Amir Abu Khadija, had been killed. Knowing how terrorist organisations operate, is this setback for ISIS?
On March 13, Iraqi security forces, with support from the US-led international coalition, killed Abdullah Makki Muslih al-Rafiei, also known as Abu Khadija. He was a top ISIS leader, responsible for the group’s operations in Iraq and Syria. His death is a major setback for the organization, but ISIS is far from defeated – it continues to exploit instability across the Middle East.
Even without controlling large territories, the group still operates as a decentralized network, taking advantage of weak governments and political chaos. In Syria, it has been regaining strength amid ongoing turmoil, while in Iraq, its fighters have stepped up attacks on security forces.
The threat isn’t limited to the Middle East. In Europe, ISIS-inspired extremists remain a danger, often using simple but deadly tactics – like knife attacks or ramming vehicles into crowds – to spread fear.
Minorities living in both countries, mainly Eastern Christians, have been supported by various USAID programmes following the persecution by ISIS. How could the withdrawal of these aids put the hard-hit communities in a difficult position? In general, how dependent are Syria and Iraq on development funds?
Iraq is heavily dependent on international aid, more so in areas devastated by the conflict. Though oil revenues are high, external finances, mainly from USAID, the UN, and the EU, played a very important part in post-war reconstruction. Vulnerability is greater in the Kurdistan Region because it has meager financial resources and mainly depends on foreign aid.
But dwindling U.S. aid in recent times has spelled more than surprise. Iraqi officials and local communities alike reacted with shock when USAID put a stop to funding in some regions that were benefiting from U.S. aid in the past. Since USAID has always been the main pillar of efforts to stabilize northern Iraq, any further cuts will only escalate the humanitarian disaster, kick-off fresh waves of migration, and leave minorities more untenably exposed to insecurity.
Hungary is supporting several reconstruction projects in Iraq through the Hungary Helps program. Specifically, what kind of current active investments are you aware of?
Hungary has become a considerable giver to Iraq’s humanitarian and development efforts. The Hungary Helps initiative has spurred a series of projects within the nation to rebuild post-conflict communities, particularly those that experienced rampant devastation by the Islamic State. Most visible among them is the reconstruction of Tell-Asquf – 1,000 out of 1,300 displaced families can come back with Hungarian support. Additionally, several millions of dollars have been directed toward investments to reconstruct Christian villages and schools and assist refugees in the Nineveh Plains.
How can these projects contribute to Hungary’s soft power in Iraq or the region?
The Hungary Helps initiative carries out a comprehensive development plan in Iraq, placing its center of gravity in the repair provided to persecuted Christians and other marginalized groups. Months ago, the Hungary Helps program led the Iraqi Chaldean Community Foundation to define Hungary as a frontline ally with the Iraqi Christian minority, acknowledging that Budapest had granted the most aid through this initiative than any other government.
Sayfo Omar: I Think Donald Trump Understands the Language of the Middle East in Many Ways
Firstly, can you please briefly introduce what state of affairs Ahmad al-Shara inherited in Syria and what has been the country’s development since then?
The Syrian government is practically tied with its hands. We can say that Turkey is the main shareholder of Syria now, but Ankara is not in an economic position to help the Syrian government. Although Syria received help from Qatar, this is not enough. They need Saudi Arabia, for example, to open the money taps. The Saudis, however, have reservations because of the new government’s close relationship with Turkey.
Above all, the real solution for Syria’s economy is the lifting of the sanctions that the first Trump administration’s sanctions punished the Syrian regime and anyone doing business with it.
What should the new leadership of the country do to achieve this?
According to diplomatic sources, the US has given the Syrian government a list of demands in exchange for sanctions relief, which can be met. They want the Syrian government to cut ties with Hamas and Islamic Jihad. They also demand that Iran’s Revolutionary Guards be classified as a terrorist organization, which they are also happy to comply with, as their biggest enemy is Iran. The Trump administration also wants HTS to secure the detention of the 15,000 Islamic State fighters currently controlled by the Kurds. Since the Syrian government and Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces reached an agreement, this is also a detail.
What else is on the HTS’ top priority list?
There are promises that the government has not been able to fulfill that it has made to the population. For example, public servants were promised a 400 percent pay raise. In comparison, public servants did not even receive a salary in the first 2 months; now they do, but still, not everyone receives the increased amount. The power supply is again problematic. In summary, the country’s economic situation is dire, and how it will recover is unclear.
Omar Sayfo
Earlier in March, 21,000 people fled western Syria into Lebanon following violent clashes. How will the HTS be able (or even try) to deal with sectarian differences within the country?
The HTS gained power in Idlib Governorate in 2015 and established its government after eliminating Islamist rivals in 2017. Idlib was mostly Sunni Muslim and conservative, making it easier for them to govern. Assad’s armies bussed Islamist insurgents who surrendered in Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo.
As a result, the population of Ildib province of one and a half million swelled to 4.5 million in practically a very short time. Despite this, denominationalism was not really an issue there.
Christians used to live in Idlib, but not in large numbers. They, when the insurgents – not yet HTS – took over, fled simply for security reasons. The HTS government would like to invite them back here, but only a few families have returned.
Following Assad’s expulsion, Ahmed al-Sharaa and the HTS have reconciled with minorities, including Druze and Christian leaders. While Christians have little to fear, they are not as intertwined with the Islamist regime. However, the Alawite minority, which makes up 10 percent of the population, was the main support of Assad’s regime, which is causing them big concerns now, as the massacres of recent weeks have proven. The previous regime relied on them and filled the ranks of the army, the police, and the bureaucracy with them as much as possible. The HTS is not accepting Alawites into the newly recruited army and security forces. So, their livelihood is in serious danger.
What can you say about the Syrian regular forces?
The HTS has only 30,000 militants, and they struggle to curb other Islamist groups that support them but are not directly affiliated with them, as we have seen in the above-mentioned arbitrary revenge campaigns against the Alawites.
The government may increase the number of armed forces by approximately 30 thousand more, with those who have been trained through crash military training. In this regard, their opportunities are limited as they do not have enough money to pay the new members’ salaries. And due to government reconciliation with the Kurds, an additional 60,000 Kurds could join the regular forces.
What is known about these Kurdish forces?
The Kurdish forces are equipped with advanced American weapons and are typically secular forces. Thanks to an eight-point list agreed upon by al-Sharaa and Kurdish leader Mazlum Kobane, they may be able to counter any future anti-government rebel groups.
Apart from what has been published about him in the media, what should we know about the president, Ahmad al-Sharaa? How did the former terrorist leader become a statesman recognized by everyone for the time being?
Ahmed al-Sharaa started the fight against the Americans in Iraq in the ranks of al-Qaeda; he was put into prison by the Americans, so, understandably, many people have reservations about him.
He was a former terrorist leader who re-radicalized, breaking with al-Qaeda and fighting against the Islamic State. He has also been a pragmatic politician, transitioning from a terrorist to a militia leader, warlord, and now president of a country, demonstrating a one-way street approach to politics. He has been approaching politics with this kind of pragmatism since the early or mid-2010s. This gives us reason for optimism.
We can add that he is an educated person who comes from a middle-class environment.
Yes, we are talking about a person who socialized in Syria and knows the social dynamics of the country and its multiethnic environment. It doesn’t matter what his convictions are, but he knows these things need to be considered to stabilize his position.
Let’s speak about Syria’s international recognition. The EU has approved donating 2.5 billion in support if Syria commits to the democratic transition. What do you think? Is democratization just a totally optimistic expectation? Could this money go to the right place to rebuild the country?
I think the European Union seems to have abandoned the bright ideas about democratization in the Middle East that were typical during the Arab Spring. Basically, Tunisia and Egypt already have more autocratic leaders than their predecessors had before 2011.
However, the EU does not object to this, as it has found partners in them to stop migration and other problems. It is no coincidence that when Bashar al-Asad fell, the EU immediately welcomed the Islamists’ takeover, so this fits into this trend.
We observed that nobody in Europe wants more refugees. Moreover, many EU members want to send their Syrian refugees back. The problem here is that the right to seek asylum is an individual right, so governments are not allowed to send back groups of people to their homeland.
For the governments of European host countries, it is important that Syria become a stable country and that irregular migrants do not come to Europe from there. However, it is quite certain that Syria will not be a democratic country in the European sense.
In the history of the Middle East, there has not been a situation where someone has seized power by force and voluntarily relinquished it. So, we can expect elections in five years’ time – the transiton period what the HTS interim government indicated – only if Ahmad al-Sharaa has strengthened his position enough that there is no longer any fear that he will be deprived of his office.
That also means we wouldn’t expect any change in Syria’s political system.
Since the international public is very attentive to what is happening in Syria, the primary goal of the Syrian government is not to betray the trust they gained since the takeover. This is one of the reasons why the draft constitution has recently been announced. It contains the protection of the rights of minorities or other things that European countries have specifically requested.
The compromise with the Kurds is also a very serious step, because since Syria is an independent country, there has been no such thing as the Kurds being recognized as a state-forming nation in Syria.
This is also a reason for confidence.
Al-Sharaa told in an interview with The Rest is Politics podcast channel that he sees America as a partner and even courted Trump a little, saying that he is very optimistic about Trump’s Middle East policy. This was obviously in his interest in lifting the aforementioned sanctions. Personally, how optimistic are you about Trump’s policy in the Middle East with regard to Syria?
The United States and the Trump administration have a complex relationship with the region’s key players, like Turkey and Iran. However, Washington does not seem to have such a definite Syria policy.
Meanwhile, the Trump administration recognized their shared interest in stabilizing Syria with Turkey. This is why they made the Syrian Democratic Forces and Damascus compromise.
That could not have happened without the approval of the Americans. And we shouldn’t forget there are 2,000 American soldiers in Syria. These compromises and the sanctions allow the Americans to gain direct influence on Syria’s domestic and foreign policy. Additionally, the Americans have interests in Israel, which is concerned about the Turkish advance in Syria.
Israel is now lobbying for the Russians to keep their base on the coast. The Americans will presumably support this, given that the relations between Washington and Moscow are quite diverse, which could also be an important “trump card” in connection with the settlement in Ukraine.
Looking at the wider Middle East, let us also talk about the situation in Gaza. The Trump administration has also undertaken to solve this very complex, decades-old set of problems. Do you think the current administration will succeed in reaching an agreement or in reassuring the hostilities? What means does the US have to achieve this?
Without trying to make predictions on the issue, I think that Donald Trump understands the language of the Middle East in many ways. He knows it well that in the Middle East, with the right show of force, with due emphasis on informal negotiations, and by making the main players interested, anything can be achieved. No one would have thought that the Abraham Accords would happen, and they did. Thanks to Trump’s unorthodox measures. I believe that the recent US president’s attitude works in the Middle East.
In other words, the transactional, “I give you something if you give me something in return” kind of policy works in this region.
The demonstration of force is important, and gestures must also be made. I don’t know if this can result in a comprehensive peace. It is certain that it will not be very good for the Palestinians in the coming period, but it may follow a more peaceful period in a broader sense.
