By The Indo-Pacific is the world’s most dynamic geopolitical arena. Home to over half the global population and a major share of economic activity, the region is increasingly shaped by the strategic rivalry between the United States and China. Against this backdrop, two initiatives have become central to U.S. strategy: AUKUS and the Quad.
The re-election of the Australian Labor government amid the global uncertainty indicates that Australia’s security landscape is significantly different today compared to when Anthony Albanese’s party was first elected in 2022.
With Donald Trump’s return to the White House in 2025, the future of these frameworks hangs in the balance. On the one hand, Trump has reaffirmed their importance in containing China’s rise. Senior U.S. officials visited all Quad capitals shortly after his inauguration, and AUKUS ministers publicly reaffirmed trilateral cooperation in late 2024. At the same time, however, Trump’s protectionist policies, transactional diplomacy and political style risk undermining trust among partners. His second presidency raises an urgent question: Can strategic foresight overcome deepening mistrust?
From Atlantic to Indo-Pacific: The Long Pivot
“The United States has been, and always will be, a Pacific nation,” declared President Barack Obama in the Australian Parliament in 2011, at a crucial moment in Washington’s strategic “pivot to Asia.”
As he said on that day in Canberra, “I have made a deliberate and strategic decision – as a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future.” Since then, successive administrations have sought to reorient U.S. engagement toward the Indo-Pacific, motivated by China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and global trade institutions.
The Trump administration disrupted Obama-era multilateralism in favor of transactionalism and bilateral deals. Still, key Indo-Pacific frameworks advanced under his watch. The Quad, dormant for over a decade, was revived in 2017. AUKUS, though formally launched in 2021 under Biden, aligned with Trump-era instincts to counter China through hard power and technology.
While AUKUS (stands for Australia, United Kingdom and United States) is a security pact, Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, includes the United States, India, Japan, and Australia) is more of a strategic partnership. AUKUS is most well-known for its plan to help Australia acquire nuclear-powered submarines. However, AUKUS also focuses on sharing advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, and undersea warfare tools.
The Quad countries share a common interest in ensuring a “free and open Indo-Pacific” and collaborate on a range of issues from maritime security and counterterrorism to climate change and pandemic response.
An F-35 Lightning II takes off at the Australian International Airshow and Aerospace & Defence Exposition. Photo: U.S. Air Force/Master Sgt. John Gordinier)
Trump’s Indo-Pacific Vision: Confrontation and Control
The second Trump administration has adopted a more openly confrontational stance toward China. Top officials describe the Indo-Pacific as the primary “theatre of competition” and have pledged to bolster U.S. force posture, alliance coordination, and technological edge in the region.
Trump’s strategy places AUKUS and the Quad at the center of efforts to deter China. However, his approach is explicitly conditional: economic reciprocity is a prerequisite for deeper security integration. Allies are expected to buy U.S. arms, invest in shared tech, and align strategically, raising concerns about whether mutual interests can survive unilateral demands.
AUKUS: Submarines and Strategy Under Pressure
Pillar I: Nuclear Submarines
The most visible component of AUKUS is Pillar I: the provision of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia.
The goal is to enhance deterrence and provide Canberra with long-range, stealthy undersea capabilities by the 2030s. As of early 2025, over 60 Australian sailors had begun training with the U.S. Navy’s nuclear fleet, and Australian officers had joined U.K. nuclear engineering programs.
But Pillar I faces headwinds. Australia must contribute $2 billion toward expanding U.S. submarine production, with the first major payment due in 2025. Trump’s Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has pushed for faster payments and deeper cost-sharing. Meanwhile, simulated conflict exercises revealed strategic divergence: Australian commanders hesitated to deploy submarines near Taiwan, prompting U.S. frustration over Canberra’s willingness to “go kinetic.”
Pillar II: Advanced Capabilities
The second pillar of AUKUS focuses on future warfighting technologies. In 2024, the three partners launched the “Maritime Big Play” to test AI-enabled autonomous vehicles and undersea drones.
Shared P-8 patrol aircraft have begun incorporating AI for anti-submarine warfare, and work continues on joint torpedo platforms and quantum navigation tools.
Yet the pace of innovation is constrained. Australia’s $350+ billion submarine investment leaves little room for other defense spending. Critics in Canberra argue that AUKUS offers few economic offsets, no tariff relief, and deeper dependency on U.S. supply chains. Trump’s recent reimposition of steel and aluminum tariffs on Australian exports only fuels these concerns.
The Quad: Expanding Roles, But at What Cost?
Strategic Dialogue and Diplomacy
The Quad has regained momentum under Trump. In January 2025, foreign ministers convened in Washington to reaffirm their shared commitments to a ”free and open Indo-Pacific”. Follow-on working groups have advanced cooperation on maritime domain awareness, cybersecurity, and semiconductor supply chains.
Military Integration
Joint military exercises are expanding. The 2024 Malabar exercise off India’s eastern seaboard included advanced anti-submarine warfare drills, while the U.S. and India held tri-service training under Tiger Triumph. Logistics exchange agreements have simplified refueling and resupply among the Quad navies, and Japan is on track to reach 2% of GDP in defense spending by 2027.
Technology and Defense Sales
The Trump administration views the Quad as both a strategic and economic vehicle. It has offered India arms packages worth “billions,” including F-35 jets, though New Delhi rejected the proposal due to sovereignty concerns and public backlash.
Australia has committed to buying three U.S.-made Virginia-class submarines, while Japan is pursuing deeper industrial partnerships with U.S. defense firms.
In 2025, the four nations launched the Autonomous Systems Industry Alliance (ASIA), a public-private venture to coordinate on maritime AI. The Quad also aims to deploy open-source 5G/6G networks across the Indo-Pacific, with a focus on digital resilience for Pacific Island states.
Continuity and Contrast: From Biden to Trump
The shift from Biden to Trump highlights deeper tensions within U.S. alliance management. Biden emphasized long-term trust, institutional cooperation, and shared values. Trump prioritizes reciprocity and speed. His reimposed tariffs on Australian goods and threats to scale back defense guarantees unless partners “pay their share” illustrate this logic.
The result is a paradox: alliances are expanding in military scope but fraying politically. Allies may seek security ties with the U.S. while hedging economically and diplomatically with China.
Regional and Domestic Resonances
Australia continues to support AUKUS, but public and elite skepticism is rising. Former Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull warns the pact undermines sovereignty and risks entangling Australia in U.S. conflicts. Environmental and Indigenous groups remain concerned about nuclear waste and consultation. Meanwhile, Trump-era tariffs have triggered calls in Parliament to reassess the economic costs of alignment.
India values strategic autonomy and has resisted deeper bloc alignment. While defense ties with the U.S. remain strong, India continues to engage China through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, reflecting its balancing instincts.
Japan, though committed to the Quad and expanding its defense budget, faces domestic resistance to further militarization and trade tensions with the U.S. Trump’s unilateral approach threatens to destabilize Tokyo’s careful balancing of deterrence and diplomacy.
China’s Reaction: Pushback Without Provocation
Beijing has denounced AUKUS and the Quad as relics of Cold War thinking. Chinese state media frame them as U.S.-led efforts to contain China and divide the region. Yet, China has responded with both caution and counter-strategy. PLA Navy patrols have become more restrained in contested waters, and Beijing has intensified infrastructure diplomacy with Southeast Asia.
While the presence of AUKUS and Quad forces has arguably deterred overt aggression, China is adapting through asymmetric means, such as cyber attacks, economic coercion, and influence campaigns in small island states.
The Road Ahead: Strategy or Stalemate?
Trump’s second term offers a test of alliance resilience. AUKUS and the Quad could consolidate into powerful instruments of deterrence and innovation. But their success depends on mutual trust, strategic alignment, and the ability to absorb political shocks.
If Trump treats allies primarily as clients, and if economic coercion overtakes security coordination, these frameworks could unravel. Already, allies are showing signs of hedging, softening stances, or reconsidering their roles.
For now, the future of the Indo-Pacific depends on whether partners can look beyond personalities and focus on their common goal: ensuring peace, freedom and stability in the world’s most consequential region.
Either way, the Indo-Pacific is becoming the world’s most closely watched geopolitical hotspot, and AUKUS and the Quad are at the heart of it.
